

Analysis of the Results of a Questionnaire on Corruption in the Regime's Apparatus, State Institutions, and People's Organizations in Libya, 2006

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Naturally there are a variety of definitions for corruption, all of which agree that it consists of a breach in the law and order, by either misusing their absence, or, lacking of commitment to them, with the purpose of gaining some personal or group interests in political, economic, or social fields. It is also rational to view the phenomenon of corruption as a behavior that violates the official duties of a public office with the purpose of achieving personal (material or moral) gains. Therefore, in this report, corruption is dealt with as an illegal act as defined by Transparency International: "Any act that involves abuse of a public office with the purpose of gaining some personal interest for the abuser or his/her group." Corruption may sometimes cause damage (material or moral) to public interest. Furthermore, it is an immoral and non-patriotic act.

The overall concept of managerial and financial corruption encompasses all illegal acts that may violate the state laws and regulations. They include all acts that sustain the purpose of achieving personal gains to the detriment of public interest. Some examples include the misuse of public property, the acceptance of bribes, gifts, or grant, regard of favoritism or nepotism, and disregard of competence and equal opportunities, in employing as well as the embezzlement

of millions in the form of commissions, deals, contracts, and large financial agreements.

First, a note should be made of the extreme difficulty we faced in observing events to reach the facts and positions hidden behind them, not to mention acquiring documented statistics from Libyan official sources. Based on our complete conviction that the right to know and the right to have access to information are among the basic rights guaranteed by all international pacts and charters, we have designed a questionnaire on corruption in Libya with the intention to publish our results on our sites and via all means of electronic dissemination. The World Proclamation of Human Rights and the International Pact on civil and political rights (Article 19 of both the Proclamation and the Pact), emphasize these rights. Because freedom of opinion and the right to have access to information and to publish them are interrelated, our questionnaire was the best 'available' alternative. It should be admitted that the electronic questionnaire cannot be equal to a scientific questionnaire with all its requirements. Nonetheless, we found it to be sufficient for us to complete our report, with some extent of objectivity, based on documented statistics, numbers, and analyses.

The Libyan authorities' policies have always consisted of imposing absolute control of information, especially the various forms of media. For the past three decades, the media has been characterized by a total lack of independence, competence and transparency, completely absent of what we may call 'free press.' It is true that a number of websites have appeared inside Libya and timidly revealed some aspects of corruption. Yet, despite the fact that Libya has the professional efficacies needed to handle these issues with a great deal of courage and investigational spirit, these websites seem to have been serving some private agendas. Moreover, the lack of any legal guarantees makes the opening of certain files seem like some sort of insanity. In view of all these aspects, the initiative to design and disseminate this questionnaire seems like a rational and practical procedure. The questionnaire has been designed in a manner that suits the purpose and nature of the data needed. The facility of data entry and electronic preparation has also been taken into consideration.

The questionnaire has been disseminated via email. Then, it was published on the main pages of www.transparency-libya.com , www.libyaforum.org , www.akhbar-libya.com , www.justice4libya.com and other Libyan websites have also published the link to participate in the questionnaire for various periods of time.

The initial reading, which encompassed 500 respondents, included the following basic information about the respondents: sex, age, social status, number of family members, residency region, educational level, and profession/craft.

The results of the personal information came as follows:

As expected, men's participation was 90.02 percent; women. 9.98 percent, less than the percentage targeted.

The age category 36-43 had the most respondents (37.40 percent); followed by the category 26-35 (35.6 percent); then came the category 46-55 (16.06 percent); then, the category 16-25 (7.32 percent); and finally, the category above 55 years of age (0.7 percent).

Most of the respondents were married (62.20 percent); then, singles (33.13 percent); then, divorcees (3.25 percent); and finally the widowed (1.42 percent).

The greater part of the respondents (43.94 percent) belonged to middle-size families (3-5 members); followed by (36.15 percent) of larger-size families (more than 5 members); followed by (19.91 percent) of small-size families (less than 5 members).

Within the Category of the residency region, the greater proportion was from the western region (50.52 percent); then the eastern region (32.51 percent); then, the central region (11.18 percent), then, the southern region (4.35 percent), then the oases region (4.35 percent).

The respondents' educational level displayed a link between participation in the questionnaire and access to computers and the Internet. So, the category of educated persons came first and foremost. The proportion of those with university degrees and higher was the highest (44.44 percent); followed by those in higher education (38.27 percent); then those with high school degrees (13.99 percent); then those with a pre-high school education (3.92 percent).

The category of profession/specialty/craft represented the structure of the Libyan society. Public sector (or government) employees came first (43.12 percent); then private sector employees (23.48 percent); then retirees and the unemployed (16.19 percent), which is close to the unemployment rate in Libya; then foreign company employees (12.73 percent); then, students and trainees (3.64 percent); while People's organizations' employees came last (0.81 percent).

The preliminary reading of the results encompasses 500 respondents representing a 'random' sample of Libyan citizens with access to the Internet. However, the results were in proportion to the structure of the Libyan society, except the rate of women compared to that of men, which we hoped to be higher.

The questionnaire included specific questions on the following aspects of corruption:

The most widespread fields of corruption in the state's and society's institutions;

The most corruption-practicing elements of power;

The rate of increase or decrease of corruption in various forms in various institutions;

The criteria and norms by which members of inspection committees, public control, financial and bureaucratic accounting in the state's institutions, are chosen;

The criteria and norms by which heads and members of the committees assigned to revise and examine the forms of transparency presented by the state's officials, are chosen;

The role the institutions of the state, government, and society play in exposing and combating corruption;

The role the institutions of the state, government, and society play in backing, protecting, or cajoling the symbols of corruption;

The spread of corruption in the state's institutions, public and private sectors, firms, people's organizations, foreign companies, and international agencies working in Libya;

The impact of the varied forms of corruption on the government's efficacy in running the state's and society's affairs, and on various economic, trade, environmental, educational, cultural, intellectual, and social activities;

How serious and capable the ruling authorities are to combat corruption and put an end to the mafias of corruption in the country;

The necessity to have a wide-range alliance of civil society organizations to fight corruption, expose the 'mafias' of corruption, and prosecuting them with all possible means inside the country and abroad.

Results of the Questionnaire on Corruption

The Major Fields of Financial and Bureaucratic Corruption in Libya:

The forms of corruption have remarkably increased over the year 2006, especially after the relative opening to the world abroad. Qaddafi was able to eliminate the major issues with the West. As a result, Libya signed hundreds of contracts and economic agreements with U.S., western, and eastern companies in the fields of exploring, producing, and marketing oil. Agreements have been held to reconstruct the country in all aspects of public life, which meant billions

needed to remedy the chronic crises suffered by the country infrastructure. This also resulted in thousands of businessmen and companies coming to benefit from the newly-emerging investment opportunities. All this made the opportunities of corruption grow faster. This remark has been supported by the questionnaire's results.

Upon asking the respondents: To what extent the rate of corruption of all forms increased or decreased within the institution they work at or deal with in 2006, the answer were as follows:

45.03 percent responded that the rate of corruption increased to a great extent;

26.64 percent responded that they had no chance to determine;

18.18 percent responded that the rate of corruption increased to some extent;

8.46 percent responded that the rate of corruption decreased to some extent;

1.69 percent responded that the rate of corruption decreased to a great extent.

The questionnaire concluded that the areas of corruption in Libya, especially in 2006, vary and spread in convergent rates. This proves that corruption of all forms spread unchecked in the state's institutions and in society in the following order:

Direct and indirect stealing and embezzlement of public money (11.68 percent);

Nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal opportunities (11.28 percent);

Nepotism in performing personal favors for relatives and friends (10.80 percent);

The use of public resources for personal, law-breaking interest (10.77 percent);

Laying hold of certain amounts of money as commission for trade contracts or purchases (10.67 percent);

Asking for, and giving, bribes in return for certain favor (10.67 percent);

Tampering with figures in reports and information with the purpose of forgery and fraud (9.41 percent);


Illegally acquiring certain law-breaking material privileges for some reason (9.24 percent);

Money Laundry as a means to evade the law (7.09 percent);

On revising the most widespread and effective cycles of corruption in state's institutions and in society, these may be rearranged as follows:

1. Stealing Oil Revenues

Oil revenues and the state's destinies in general have long been deemed lawful to steal by the ruling elite, including members of the Leader's family, close friends, and the politically, Revolutionary, economically, and tribally influential figures. This is a fertile field of corruption that can hardly be estimated or confined. There is no way for any observer of this phenomenon to determine the amounts of money being stolen by Colonel Qaddafi, nor the properties and money at the disposal of his sons and daughters (including Hanaa, the adopted one), nor the areas of land the Colonel's wife, Safiyya Firkash, has been well-known to have seized. Some of the information that leaks here and there about this ruling dynasty's manipulation of the state's fate may represent only the tip of the iceberg whose depth and size can hardly be measured. This extends to include all close associates of tribesmen, military and security elite, People's Committees' leaderships, and local investment companies.



On surveying opinions about the most corrupt elements in power (where respondents can choose more than one option), the results came as follows:

- 1- The Revolutionary Committees' leaderships (18.08 percent);
- 2- Members of People's Committees (municipalities) and People's Congresses (18.03 percent);
- 3- Members of the ruling family (16.62 percent);
- 4- Prominent figures within the Qaddafi Tribe (16.12 percent);
- 5- Businessmen favored by the authorities (15.95 percent);
- 6- Army and police officers (15.20 percent).


2. Pillage of Public Money

This means laying hands on the state's institutions' allocations and acting freely with them under various names. Despite all that is being claimed about standing up against the "Fat Cats", i.e., the symbols of corruption in Libya, the influential figures in Libyan government institutions (ministries of the People's Committees, secretariats of the People's Congresses, heads of government projects, army officers, etc) still carry on abusing offices and public positions to gain personal privileges (cars, telephones, tremendous amounts of illegal money, contracts, agencies, commissions, etc), especially when it comes to infrastructure projects.

Means of public money pillage vary, each according to their position, courage, connections, and the institutions they run or work at. This includes, for example, the ministers and executives who use for personal and family purposes the cars allocated to the ministries or the projects they run. Others tamper with the 'odds and ends', which are usually settled by forged bills. As a result, the original value of a bill is paid in double by the public budget, and the settlement goes to the executive or one of his aids. Tremendous amounts of money are distributed to the influential figures in form of training courses and or duties abroad. The higher the office, the more costly the benefits are. Thus, training courses and duties abroad represent a major field of pillage with almost no avail to the public authority being pillaged.

Among the major results of the Questionnaire was that the various practices of corruption have prevailed in all apparatus of the regime and institutions of the state. The distribution of opinions seems convergent among most institutions so that the differences display no major statistical significant difference. The distinction of various institutions in regards to the prevalence of corruption was displayed in the following question:

Suppose you learned in a direct or an indirect way, or from some trustful source, or forced to practice any of the forms of corruption listed above, at which apparatus, institution, or organization, did this occur? The answer was as follows:



1- People's Committees: Public People's Committees, the municipal People's Committees, and the rest of the People's Committees (7.09 percent);

2- Customs and licensing institutions, etc. (5.61 percent);

3- Economic institutions: banks, companies, public marketplaces, investment corporations (6.46 percent);

4- Apparatus of Revolutionary Committees: Communication Bureau, , Coordinators of Revolutionary Work (6.42 percent);

5- Security apparatus: the intelligence, internal security, external security, public security, police forces (6.12 percent);

6- Institutions located abroad: People's bureaus, medical bureaus, student bureaus, and *Dawa* Association Bureaus (5.85 percent);

7- Educational institutions: universities, colleges, schools, institutes, Administration of exchange students (5.85 percent);

8- Medical institutions: hospitals, medical centers, infirmaries, clinics (5.61 percent);

- 9- Customs institutions , at airports, seaports, and land border gates (5.40 percent);
- 10- Service institutions: electricity, telephones, water supplies, transportation (5.29 percent);
- 11- Institutions of taxes, insurance, and social welfare (5.16 percent);
- 12- Institutions, companies, and organizations owned by Qaddafi's sons: Development, *Waatassimu*, *Libyana*, *al-Madar* (5.03 percent);
- 13- State institutions of inspection, bureaucratic control, financial auditing (4.94 percent);
- 14- Military institutions: armed forces, security divisions, military clubs and stores (4.77 percent);
- 15- Judicial institutions: courthouses, district attorney, public attorney (4.46 percent);
- 16- Apparatus directly connected to the leadership: Leader's Information Bureau, private guards (4.50 percent);
- 17- Public organizations: guilds, trade unions, syndicates, clubs, and leagues (4.09 percent);
- 18- Private sector institutions, companies, agencies, stores, and private marketplaces (3.39 percent);
- 19- Media institutions: newspapers, radio, television, publications, distribution (3.05 percent).

Although the difference among various institutions is null, the order of institutions as far as corruption is concerned came out similar to what any observer of financial and bureaucratic corruption in Libya might notice. The People's Committees, the Revolutionary Committees, security apparatus, public companies, and government enterprises came first, while the institutions of the private sector, public organizations, and media institutions came last.

Although companies and private sector institutions come last as far as corruption is concerned, this does not mean that corruption is totally nonexistent. No doubt business relations between some employees and their partners or producers in foreign countries use illegal means to provide services to foreign companies, gain privileges and monopolies at the local market, or sell bad goods inside Libya.

The rate that came against all expectations was at the apparatus controlled by the leadership and the institutions and companies owned by Qaddafi's sons. The

reason for this may lie in the fact that these institutions being unavailable to deal with common citizens. Rather, they deal exclusively with big state officials and major companies executing gigantic projects in the country. Moreover, corruption on this level – of sons and aids – is not to be measured only by quantity, but also by quality. A single commission to sign up a project contract worth tens of millions surely equals tens or even hundreds of bribes acquired by minor employees in state institutions.

3. Bribes and Commissions


These include acquiring cash or any other benefits in return for executing or abstaining from executing an act that violates regulations. Bribery has recently become widespread in all transactions of citizens with the state institutions, and in all bureaucratic transactions between public and private sector institutions, most notably tax and custom exemptions, business or construction contracts, licenses to unqualified persons or companies in return for cash. This denies the public treasury some of its major resources. Bribes sometimes come in the form of extortion through which some public officials acquire money from some party in return for a favor or an interest related to the person who practices corruption.

4. Nepotism and Favoritism

This includes any kind of intervention on the part of a public employee or authority to the advantage of an individual or a group of people that goes against the regulations. Nepotism gets clearer in appointing someone to a position for reasons based on kinship or tribal affiliation and despite incompetence, disqualification, or lack of eligibility. These also apply to an official who gives away certain material benefits on family or tribal bases, with disregard to the ineligibility that exists. For example, when a small technician or engineer becomes a secretary of a Public People's Committee of a multi-million-dollar-budget institution by nepotism, such a secretary is often ready to practice all types of financial, bureaucratic, and moral pillage and corruption.

Favoritism extends to include favors to the advantage of some individual or some authority to which one belongs, like the family, tribe, authority, region, etc, without being eligible for it. The best example for this is probably what happens in People's Committees when government tenders are announced. Tenders usually are illegally given to specific companies or partnerships with some connections with officials, their family members, or tribes, via illegal deals between the parties concerned and in absolute absence of integrity and transparency. Sometimes tenders are given to specific companies against the legal procedures required. Under this category also there the kind of favoritism by which some particular authority gets illegally favored to attain certain services.

By comparing the areas of corruption, they could be combined in three major types:



1. Theft, commissions, bribes, and money laundry, with millions and tens of millions of dollars being involved.
2. Nepotism and favoritism, with thousands and tens of thousands of dollars being involved.
3. Privileges and exploitation of public resources, with thousands of dollars being involved.

One may safely claim, as the diagram shows, that the rates in all three types are convergent, which emphasizes that the aspects of corruption may vary and cannot be thoroughly listed. They vary according to the authority in question, and to the interest being sought.

Corruption may be practiced by an individual, a group of people, a private institution, an official, or a non-government authority. It may seek some material benefit, political gain, or social privilege. Corruption can be individually practiced with a personal initiative and without coordination with other individuals or authorities. It may also be practiced by a group of people in an organized and coordinated way. The latter is the most dangerous type of corruption, since it permeates in the political, economic, and social structure of society.

However, a distinction should be made between the material weights of various types of corruption. Favoritism and nepotism are confined to thousands of dollars. Acquiring privileges may cost the public budget tens of thousands; while bribes, thefts, and money laundry practiced by major figures of corruption may amount to millions, and even tens and hundreds of millions of dollars.

All evidence indicates that corruption is rampant in both state and society in Libya, and includes minor and marginal types practiced by small public servants. So, any transaction or bureaucratic procedure, no matter how minor, requires a

bribe for the top official of that authority, and sometimes for a whole team of public servants, who coordinate to facilitate the procedures of corruption.

It also includes major types of corruption practiced by major officials on issues larger than daily bureaucratic transactions, with the purpose of gaining privileges much bigger than just a small bribe. This is to say that corruption in Libya is rife horizontally, vertically, and in all directions.

Factors of Aggravating Corruption Phenomenon in Society

The major factors that led to the aggravation of corruption in Libyan society during the year in question were as follows:

1. Lack of real propensity on the part of the political leadership to combat corruption:

A recent project has been announced recently by the regime requiring government officials to fill forms called 'transparency declaration' with a deadline at the end of December 2006, extended to March 2007. When asked about whether the regime was serious in fighting corruption, the respondents' answers came as follows:

- No, 78.06 percent;
- Yes, 7.10 percent;
- I don't know, 14.84 percent.

These results are concordant with any minor revision of the Libyan regime's anti-corruption record. Colonel Qaddafi never took serious precautionary procedures against the elements of corruption. This reluctance is due to several reasons. First of all, he has always employed the issue of corruption to racketeer absolute loyalty to his own regime. Qaddafi is known to have taken punitive procedures in several cases against state officials for charges of financial corruption. In more than one case, however, he allowed these same officials to come back to higher and even more sensitive positions with bigger chances of corruption. This inspired many that Colonel Qaddafi personally manipulates symbols of corruption for a special agenda of his own that gives top priority to their loyalty to his regime.

It may be useful in this context to point out how Libyan citizens received Qaddafi's speech on August 31, 2006, in which he attacked the Revolutionary leaderships entangled in corruption, giving them a grace period to repent and fill 'transparency declarations'. The citizens' response was skeptical of the authority's seriousness in this regard. There were many evidences that the 'transparency declaration' program was, to a great extent, similar to the so-called 'Revolutionary Caravans' or 'Purging Campaigns' launched late in 1996 by the

Revolutionary Committees through the steering of Colonel Qaddafi. Many wonder about the difference between this procedure and any previous one in the past.

The prevalent sense in intellectual circles is that Colonel Qaddafi can launch a program to reform the internal affairs and fight corruption within months. However he has no intention to do anything to curb these 'Fat Cats', simply because of their loyalty to his person and because of the favors they have done his regime.

On surveying public opinion about this issue, the Questionnaire's results came to emphasize these same convictions.

To the question: Do you think the regime is capable – if they want – to fight corruption and put an end to the mafias of corruption in both state and society?

The respondents' opinions came as follows:

- Yes, 54.70 percent;
- No, 35.47 percent;
- I don't know, 9.83 percent.

Then, the problem lies in the political leadership's lack of will to fight corruption in the country.

Regarding what is to be expected from the 'transparency declaration' program, the following question was asked: What result is to be expected from the 'transparency declaration' program after the grace period, turning in the Forms, and their revision?

The opinions came in the following order:

- 22.04 percent, revealing the identity of some individuals on television, just like previous purge campaigns.
- 18.60 percent for Qaddafi's announcement of a campaign against corruption during the 'General People's Congresses', but without any real procedures against the corrupt.
- 18.11 percent for a cabinet change to get rid of some elements as scapegoats.
- 12.88 percent for closing the door by exonerating everybody from the charge of corruption.

- 12.40 percent for delaying the whole issue to a later time.
- 11.64 percent for restoring some amounts of money from some figures of corruption in return for amnesty.
- 4.34 percent for bringing elements of corruption to transparent and integral justice without interference on the part of the authorities.

One may conclude that the 'transparency declaration' program will end up, at best, reducing the phenomenon of corruption by bringing a few scapegoats to justice. Thus, closing the whole issue in preparation for another round of manipulation in the future is in favor of the regime's proper agenda.

Within the context of future expectations under the 'best scenarios', the respondents were asked: Suppose that the regime's purpose of this whole campaign was achieved, what do you expect in regard to the spread of corruption in state and society in the next years?

The answers came to reflect pessimism and despair concerning the possibility to end corruption in Libya:

- 36.27 percent for "no change in regards to the spread of corruption";
- 26.62 percent for "a relative decrease in the spread of corruption";
- 22.43 percent for "a relative increase in the spread of corruption";
- 14.68 percent for "I don't know".

Among the other evidence that reflects the leadership's reluctance to combat corruption in their insistence to hold on to a number of figures at sensitive executive positions for long periods of time. This takes place despite their proven incompetence and being formerly indicted in corruption-related lawsuits. The political leadership's connivance of the corrupt even enabled these elements to permeate and widen their overlapping interest connections.

Asked about the criteria by virtue of which heads and members of the committees assigned to check and revise the 'transparency declarations' filled by state officials, the answers came as follows:

- 32.76 percent for "Appointed by the 'Communication Bureau' of the Revolutionary Committees";
- 30.71 percent for "Personal interest with those in charge of each institution";
- 27.14 percent for "Tribal, family, and interest links".

The least rate of opinions came for the norms of integrity, competence, and public nomination at People's Conferences:

- 5.31 percent for integrity, competence, authenticity and profession;
- 4.08 percent for public nomination at People's Congresses.

2. Impotent and Dependent Apparatus of Control of the State and Civil Society Organizations

Among the major defects of the "People's Authority System is the lack of commitment to the principle of balanced separation of powers, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of power. In the Libyan political system, there is a great overlapping among the three powers. The power of 'Revolutionary Legitimacy' overwhelms all powers, which causes some drawbacks to the principle of mutual control. The impotence, lack of independence and integrity of the judicial apparatus is one of the major factors of encouraging corruption.

Asked about the criteria by which secretaries and members of the inspection, public control, bureaucratic and financial auditing committees in the state's institutions, the answers came as follows

- 31.30 percent for "recommendation and direct appointment by the Communication Bureau of the Revolutionary Committees";
- 30.71 percent for "Tribal, family and region kinship";
- 28.79 percent for "Personal interest with those in charge of the institution".

The results were not surprising when the least percentage was given to "competence, integrity, and profession". They also give no credit to the process of public nomination at People's Congresses, which may be viewed as an indictment of the entire experience of 'People's Authority':

- 6.11 percent for "Public nomination at People's Congresses"
- 3.10 percent for "Competence, integrity, and profession".

It may be noted from the results that the traditional links based on the tribe, clan, kinship, and affinity play a major role in taking the top positions in executive institutions, regardless of competence, integrity, and profession. The Libyan society is a tribal one ruled by tribal and clan kinships. Individuals always have strong motives to acquire gains for the tribe or the clan, though this may be at the expense of the law and the values of society. Some tribes even vehemently vie for some vested rights in the municipalities to which they belong.

Among the other defects of the totalitarian revolutionary system in Libya, despite all allegations and slogans, is the absence of any apparatus for bureaucratic or financial surveillance and auditing. Chaos, inadvertence, and lack of any control at all levels are the overwhelming characteristics of the Libyan State's institutions, save security. In time, this resulted in more chances for corruption, especially at the present while the country undergoes major political, economic, and social transformations.

Chaos and bureaucratic inadvertence, which are direct results of the totalitarian revolutionary system, curb the state's need to go on with the institutional construction and the legal framework, which may provide the right milieu for curbing the schemes of the corrupt. The opposite has happened. Chaos and bureaucratic inadvertence prevalent in all state institutions provided the proper environment for the corrupt, which profited from the powerless control system in the state.

The prevalent sense in public circles is that corruption has broken out in state institutions and society for two reasons:

1. The authorities, state institutions and society's inability to expose and fight corruption.
2. The authorities' suspicious role in backing and protecting the corrupt.

Both questions were raised to the respondents in this questionnaire. Regarding the various institutions' role in exposing and fighting corruption, the respondents had the options to describe this role as 'positive', 'negative', 'neutral', or 'helpless'. The results came as follows:

Institution	helpless	negative	neutral	positive
Justice, surveillance, security	49.05%	43.58%	4.63%	2.74%
Trade unions and leagues	52.78%	38.68%	6.84%	1.71%
Official media	47.97%	43.68%	5.35%	3.00%

The results displayed how helpless and negative state institutions and official media organizations are in exposing and combating corruption. Civil society organizations, if found in the first place, are always marginalized and besieged by the regime. However, their results proved encouraging compared to those of the authorities' instruments. The rate of helplessness in these civil society organizations was relatively close to those in state institutions. Yet, the rate of positive roles was relatively higher in the following order: Libyan opposition abroad, private media, and finally civil society organizations.

Organization	negative	neutral	positive	Helpless
Private media	48.52%	29.84%	5.24%	16.40%
Civil society organizations	56.61%	25.77%	9.91%	7.71%
Libyan opposition Abroad	16.45%	2.38%	55.84%	25.32%

The relatively higher rate of the positive role given to the Libyan opposition abroad is distinguished from other tribunes because of the efforts of some websites abroad to expose corruption practices with documented and highly objective reports. www.akhbar-libya.com and www.transparency-libya.com had a greater role in this respect.

Objectively considering the results of the Questionnaire, under the current circumstances, there is no chance to practice any kind of control. The possibility to work on combating bureaucratic and financial corruption, by any objective and neutral authority over the performance of both public and private sectors is also not plausible.

The negative idea prevailing in public circles is that whoever tries to expose corruption or stand up against its figures would be making themselves susceptible to oppression and intimidation by the 'Fat Cats' benefiting from the regime and the forces that back them with support and protection.

3. Absence of Free Media and Lack of Access to Public Information and Records

The Jamahiriya system has totally marginalized the controlling role of the fourth power, which has eventually turned into a propagandist tool for the head of the regime. As private, independent press is absent, the official press is not expected to expose violations and corruption. Although some newspapers have published a few reports criticizing a few aspects of corruption, such moves have always been counted among the revolutionary liquidation of the so-called "anti-Revolution reactionary forces".

The lack of anti-corruption legislations that impose real penalties on those involved and secures guarantees for media reporters against persecution and oppression by the corrupt and figures of corruption has contributed to a great extent to marginalizing the role of the media.

4. Low Levels of Public Wages and Services

The low payments of public servants, who represent the majority of the working force in Libya, in addition to the ever-increasing standards of living, has created a proper environment for corruption to thrive in both state and society. Thus, every citizen's priority has become how to secure additional financial resources by any means, including bribery.

Meanwhile, the low-level (or complete absence) of public utilities and services that naturally secure citizens' interests, by virtue of the rights of citizenship, has forced citizens to seek illegal means of competition to get their rights and interest. This environment has encouraged the development of bribery, nepotism, and favoritism in public sector institutions.

For example, one of the means a public servant may use to obtain more income is to keep at home the stamps and seals of his employer government institution so that they may illegally use them in return for cash commissions from those who may need them. Customers, company agents, or store owners thus wind up with two options: either pay large amounts of money in taxes, or bribe public servants for getting the government authority's seal on official documents. Some houses even turned into dens for forged documents, including tax forms, contracts, deeds, official receipts, and many other forms of illegal transactions.

Impacts of Corruption


Corruption has so many costly effects on all political, economic, social, intellectual and educational aspects of life. The slogan we have adopted on our website, transparencylibya.com, (shown below) may show how comprehensive the impacts of corruption are in state and society.



The major negative effects of corruption are summarized in the following table, which was part of the Questionnaire. Respondents have 3 choices: 'major effect', 'limited effect', or 'no effect'. The results came as follows:

Effects of corruption on	major effect	limited effect	no effect
Economic/trade activity	96.04%	2.42%	1.54%
Education/profession	94.91%	2.21%	2.88%
Nation's development	93.68%	2.61%	3.70%
Political/legal life	91.59%	6.64%	1.77%
Government efficiency	90.09%	4.74%	5.17%
Society-ruling values/ethics	87.39%	9.51%	3.10%
Society's customs and manners	84.63%	12.25%	3.12%
Private/family/tribal life	84.46%	13.06%	2.48%

The following table shows the results of comparing higher impacts of corruption over all activities and areas:



a. Effects of corruption on economic development:

Corruption yields several negative impacts on economic development, including:

Inability of the economic system to stop the indigenous funds smuggled to foreign countries or to attract foreign investments to the country. Financial and bureaucratic corruption is inconsistent with free, competitive environment, which is an essential precondition of encouraging local and attracting foreign investments.

Lack of, or weak, development projects yields an overall weak job opportunities for the young working class and, meanwhile, exacerbates unemployment and poverty.

Waste of public resources because of the higher financial cost on public treasury.

Drain of scientific, academic, and technical brains, because of nepotism and favoritism in public offices.

Frail performance of government and political system.

b. Effects of Corruption on the performance of government and political system

Financial and Bureaucratic corruption has deep, negative effects over a government and the political system as a whole, especially its legitimacy, stability, and reputation. This is due to the fact that:

Corruption causes deficient democratic practice and disrespect of the basic rights of citizens, notably the right to equal opportunities and free access to information.

Corruption causes paralysis to the system, especially when fatal political decisions are needed on the basis of national interest rather than of the private interest of the political leadership and the corrupt junta.

Corruption drags the system and society into fatal conflicts between certain social groups when the private interests of those groups collide.

Under corruption, political hypocrisy thrives as a result of buying out tribal and political loyalties.

Corruption weakens public institutions as well as civil society organizations.

Corruption harms the political regime's reputation and foreign relations, especially with the countries and companies that may want to invest in national economy.

Finally, corruption weakens political participation as a result of distrustful public institutions and accountability mechanisms.

c. Effects of Corruption on the Educational and Social Aspects

Financial corruption causes moral values to unfasten (moral corruption), and leads citizens to frustration, carelessness, and negativity. In a tribal community, it causes fanaticism and extremism against state and social institutions. More dangerously, it causes individual as well as organized crime to thrive in reaction to the collapse of values and unequal opportunities among individuals.

d. Effects of Corruption on Profession and the Values of Public Action

Corruption leads to a lack of profession in duty fulfillment, loss of the value of work, and regress of interest in the public right.



The sense of injustice, inequity, and inequality of participation in the national wealth by the majority of the individuals of society results in social congestion, malevolence among classes, more poverty, more deprived and marginalized categories, especially women, children, youth, and those of special needs.

Is There Some Standardized Strategy Against Corruption?

At the end of the Questionnaire, the following question was listed: Is there a need to have a wide-range alliance of civil society organizations to fight corruption and to expose and pursue the mafias with all means possible, inside the country and abroad? An overwhelming majority of answers (82.33 percent) were for such a wide-range alliance; while only a minority was against or neutral (9.36 percent and 8.32 percent).



No doubt that the fight against corruption and standing up against its symbols in state and society is not an easy job, especially when corruption is so widespread like the case in our countries. This is not something to be done by statements, political threats, rhetoric festivals, or even by forms of financial statements to be filled out after a grace period during which the corrupt may arrange their situations, paperwork, and statements. Rather, this may be done by an overall strategy based on comprehensiveness and closely linked to an overall national prospect for economic, human development, and political reform.

Finally, to conclude this primary reading of the results of the Questionnaire on corruption, we may emphasize that standing up against corruption is linked to a

variety of intertwined concepts. We view them as principal elements in any strategy to stop this phenomenon in all its financial, bureaucratic, political, social, and developmental aspects. These concepts include transparency, accountability, integrity, and effective media. The bulk of these concepts constitute what one might call "culture of transparency and reform".

Transparency: This term means clarity of bureaucratic and financial transaction done by any institution, organization, company, municipality, conference, bank, college, brigade, etc, especially in connection with citizens and clients, who seek to benefit from their services and bureaucratic and financial procedures. Here it should be asserted that some certain overt culture must prevail in all ends, goals, means, and procedures in all institutions. Citizens, public servants, and officials should not feel any obscurity concerning the rights, duties, and roles of each one of them. This point is most related to citizens' right to know and to have access to information, as ensured by international treaties and charters. This also means that the concepts of freedom of expression, the right to have access and to publish information must be ensured. This should go for all transactions of government and non-government organizations, agencies and institutions.

Integrity: This is a synonym of transparency. Integrity is concerned with the moral aspects of the concept of transparency, and is linked to the set of values related to honesty, uprightness, loyalty, devotion, and profession at work. Transparency has to do with the practical and procedural aspects; integrity deals with the moral values. Thus, both are two faces of the same coin. Neither of them may exist without the other. In the absence of integrity, no practical bureaucratic procedures, no matter how transparent these may be, can stop public servants from accepting a bribe. In the absence of any deterring bureaucratic and legal regulations and procedures, a public servant's integrity cannot stop others from practicing corruption.

Accountability: This is the duty of young public servants to their superiors. To be more specific, it is the duty of the officials, be they appointed, escalated, or elected, to the public. Each and every official is required to give periodical reports on their work and how successful they are in executing it. Each and every citizen has the right to get the information needed on the transactions of public administrations so that one may make sure that they are doing their jobs. Accountability is closely related to the right to ask and inquire. This is a legitimate right of every citizen. Here comes the role of the media, government as well privates, in practicing accountability with a fact-finding mind to ensure that the officials are doing their jobs and tasks as regulated by the law. This should form the basis for continuing to acquire legal legitimacy, and remaining in their positions.

The spread and penetration of corruption in all aspects of bureaucratic, economic, and political life requires the adoption of a strategy that is based on the following necessities:

Supportive, clear political will: Any anti-corruption strategy can achieve success only when the political leadership has the will to combat corruption. Only this can mobilize all efforts of state and society to back up such a strategy, or at least ensure that any anti-corruption approach does not collide with the political power.

Deterrent regulations and legislations: The major props of such a strategy lie in bringing about deterrent, enforceable legislations and anti-corruption regulations at all levels. Such legislations should include codes for transparent financial position of top officials, illicit gain, the right to have access to information, and severe penalties in the code of criminal procedure against bribery, favoritism, and misuse of public office.

Pressing rule of law: In stable democracies, the constitution ensures the principle of separation of powers and the rule of law, and that all citizens are equal before the law. The Libyan system of governance, however, is so far from the values of democracy that the rule of law has become a far-fetched matter. Consequently, the potentials of this rule of law depend on the political will. Therefore, public, institutional, and media pressure becomes inevitable for more transparency and accountability.

Courageous independent judiciary: Among the most important factors for the anti-corruption strategy to succeed is to have an independent, powerful, and just judiciary that is free from all influences that might weaken its deterrent role. Only then it becomes impossible for the mafias of big wheels to corrupt the judges, attorney general, or lawyers, and the executive power will abide by the judicial rules.

Liabe bureaucratic and financial control: Financial control and bureaucratic accountability must be given a role over the legislative institutions through the available tools. Public accountability of cabinet members, officials, and secretaries must be deepened. All significant matters should be subjected to public debate. Investigations and interpellation of officials must be overt and civilized seeking nothing but transparency. In the case of Libya, who claims to apply the 'rule of the people', surveillance of this sort becomes rational and in accord with such an allegation.

Daring public surveillance: The public surveillance that depends on the civil society institutions and tribunes contributes significantly to the role of official surveillance agencies, like the Accounting Council and Bureaucratic Control Apparatus. Public surveillance bureaus can unveil – through the press, magazines, and websites – cases of mismanagement and negligence in government institutions, arbitrary use of power, bureaucratic and financial fraud, and absence of transparency in the procedures of public office practices. There are many examples of media initiatives in which the private reporters unveiled certain legal violations and helped justice and surveillance authorities bring violating officials to justice.

Dauntless scrutiny press: The press has such a major role to play in extracting significant rights, including the right to have access to information. This role requires that the forth power should be given the immunity needed to publish information, and do the inquiries required to unveil cases of corruption at any bureaucratic and political level.

Reverberant non-government and civil tribunes: Among the more important tasks of non-government tribunes – mosques and religious groups – and civil society organizations – clubs, societies and NGOs – is to focus on the moral dimension in their anti-corruption efforts in both public and private sectors. It is also important to mobilize their adherents to stop being negative and careless and stand up against corruption in society.

Development/edification programs: Public enlightenment is a necessary tool in fighting corruption. Edification programs can spread information on this epidemic and increase public awareness of its dangers and high costs to citizens and the country as a whole. A cultural revival is needed to show the political, economic, and social dangers of corruption. To combat corruption, field action requires an active, aware public opinion that pursues events, cares to unveil cases of corruption, and punish the corrupt by denying them the public support they need in the political system at local levels.

The starting point on the road to form a wide-range alliance of civil society organizations against corruption is to collect information on the phenomenon by pursuing big wheels of corruption like:

Bank accounts and deposits at home and abroad;

Names and addresses of the companies that acquired privileges to execute various projects;

Names and addresses of the foreign companies that deal with the indigenous symbols of corruption, and the names of the intermediaries in between.

Documents and data on the fortunes of each one of them inside and outside Libya, including photographs, diagrams, video tapes, cellular phone snapshots, etc.

Documents of public areas (camps, woods, parks) illegally granted to the regime's aids, including names, dates, the bribes paid, etc.

Documents of the value of intermediary commissions paid for illegal deals, oil sales, and various projects (the Great River, arms deals, agricultural projects, etc).

Documents on the expenditure of the Colonel's sons, ministers, investment company executives at home and abroad.

Information on the actual trade agents and middlemen who obtained exclusive privileges to import cars, appliances, equipments, plants, medications, provisions, and cigarettes, excluding other Libyan citizens.

Documents on commissions paid for purchases of military manufacturing, medications, appliances, and equipments for hospitals, universities, research centers, etc.

Documents on the number and photos of the rest houses, palaces, ranches, diamond mines, and night clubs owned by top officials abroad, and the hospitals, private clinics, and luxury cars purchased from the state treasury at home.

Replicas of forged college qualifications and the names of the universities where they obtained their higher education certificates.

Information on the agricultural and animal projects, and those who benefit from their seasonal production.

Information on the private yachts anchored at ports in Europe, their Arabian horses in racetracks in England and Emirates, and the private ocean islands and estates they own in Africa and East Asia.

Information on drug smugglers and their high-ranking police officer accomplices.

Information on how goods get cleared at seaports and airports and how custom taxes are evaded.

Our main goal should be to make the Libyan people aware of the crimes committed against their oil revenues, and of corruption, which has reigned in the alleged "state of the masses" under the rule of a corrupt and corrupter junta.

Conclusion

We may conclude this reading with a word to the entire Libyan people, and especially to the public work activists. Ever since our website – transparency-libya.com – started in December 2005, specifically for the issues of transparency and against corruption in Libya, our main objective has been to mobilize all anti-corruption efforts, and put an end to corruption mafias.

We were encouraged by the Tobruq Proclamation for the establishment of the 'Libyan Anti-Corruption Society' in June 2006. The Proclamation contained 53

signatures of teachers, engineers, businessmen, craftsmen, and hotel employees between 38 and 55 years of age, who belong to a variety of regions and native tribes from all over the country.

We also saw as a good omen what some websites abroad have reported about talks to establish a "Non-government Organization for Transparency and Against Corruption" in Benghazi. Efforts took place in Tripoli and Misrata in the same direction among a number of those interested in public issues.

We were even happier to hear about "reform websites" inside Libya, which would play a major role in breaking the barrier of fear among the masses. We still hope that dialogue and communication will start between those inside and outside over a package of national issues, especially those of reform and corruption.

By displaying this humble effort of ours for more consideration and analysis, we appeal to you all to do similar field questionnaires with the simple masses at the heart of Libyan towns and villages for a better future for our children and grandchildren.

March 1, 2007